"The message is, 'I don't want to hear anything out of the CIA. Make it go away. No scandals. Keep it quiet,'" a former senior CIA manager told Laura Rozen for her new Foreign Policy.com blog.
"They put over there a guy who is a political loyalist, who will keep everything nice and quiet, but who won't know a good piece of intelligence from a shi**y piece of intelligence, and wouldn't know a good intelligence officer" from a bad one."
Lamented another former top CIA officer, one who was hoping to get Obama's nod: "So much for a professional at the top."
"I find the choice of Leon Panetta to head the CIA a curious one," another former spy told Wired's Noah Shachtman at the Danger Room.
"On the one hand, if you are looking to pick a nation's top spook, it is generally a good idea to pick someone with more than a cursory exposure to the intelligence business. It is also more than a little annoying that we can't seem to find a CIA chief that hasn't spent all of their adult life playing politics."
Speaking of which, my CQ colleague Tim Starks drew frosty responses about Panetta from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., the incoming chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the man she is replacing, John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV of West Virginia.
"I was not informed about the selection of Leon Panetta to be the CIA director. I know nothing about this, other than what I've read," she said in a written statement in response to a query from Starks. "My position has consistently been that I believe the agency is best-served by having an intelligence professional in charge at this time."
Likewise, Rockefeller was worried that Panetta "has no intelligence experience," an aide told Starks, "because he has believed this has always been a position that should be outside of the political realm."
Panetta's limited intelligence experience demands that his deputy "be an insider and must have strong internal management skills," a senior retired operative told me.
I, too, was one of those who thought the president-elect should find someone who knows their way around the Langley labyrinths well enough to fend off self-serving bureaucrats and whip that place into shape, especially by getting rid of mid-level managers who are routinely described to me as unimaginative and overcautious.
But the public, and by extension, Obama, obviously doesn't share as high a regard for "intelligence professionals" as we inside-the-Beltwayers.
Indeed, to many people, "intelligence" and "professional" hardly belong in the same sentence after the surprise attacks of 9/11, the Iraq WMD fiasco, the continuing success of Osama Bin Laden in eluding capture, and, of course, the false confessions of top bin Laden lieutenants under torture.
The infamous "Curveball" episode, in which CIA bosses took the word of a lone informant they never even talked to as the main basis for declaring Saddam Hussein had biological weapons, showed the agency's standards of accuracy "were lower than a tabloid newspaper's," in the words of one disgusted CIA operations veteran.
Among Washington's big hitters, moreover, running the CIA was no longer considered a plum, I was told, since the creation of the National Intelligence Directorate displaced the agency as the President's daily briefer and primus inter pares in the spy community.
People who might've jumped at the chance to run it in the past now saw it as second seat in the violin section, some longtime intelligence observers were telling me.
"I wish I could say that I disagree, but I can't. It's spot on," said one top former intelligence agency head, reflecting a sentiment I heard from others.
"Everybody wants to run the whole show, especially since it gives them 'player' status in Washington, and the opportunity to hobnob with the President. Never mind that the [intelligence] community they preside over is broken, long overdue for an overhaul, and mainly turns out crap."
But if the "intelligence professionals" take a deep breath, they may find that Obama's choice is the best thing that could happen to the CIA, at least in one regard: the former White House budget director, chief of staff, congressman, onetime Republican (a Nixon appointee) and longtime Washington power broker is hardly likely to play second fiddle to a mere general or admiral occupying the DNI's chair.
One way to look at the not-yet-announced appointment is that Obama is putting his own man at the top of a very sensitive agency, one that could make or break his presidency, in the same way that JFK installed his brother Bobby at the Justice Department.
Adm. Dennis Blair, the all but officially announced DNI nominee, is not likely to miss that.
Harry B. "Skip" Brandon, a former deputy head of counterintelligence at the FBI, compared Obama's selection of Panetta to Jimmy Carter's appointment of federal judge William H. Webster to run a troubled FBI in 1978. Nine years later, President Ronald Reagan turned to Webster to take over an even more troubled CIA, which was caught up in the so-called Iran-Contra, arms-for-hostages scandal.
"He could bring a bipartisan credibility to the CIA," Brandon said of Panetta, "and calm the troubled waters there." He could also be "an honest broker on Capitol Hill," Brandon said.
And as more than one close observer put it, "No one's saying Leon who?"
By all accounts, moreover, Panetta was a strong manager and effective chief of staff in the Clinton White House, "an honest, straight shooter," in the words of one Obama booster who asked not to be named.
And from his stints as OMB director, and before that, chairmanship of the House Budget Committee, "he knows the entire scope of the intelligence budget," this person added. As chief of staff, he also sat in on the President's daily intelligence brief.
More recently, Panetta was a member of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which recommended a timetable with U.S. troop withdrawals.
But it's not likely he'll get a free pass in his confirmation hearings.
As I wrote earlier today, Panetta's nomination is likely to give Republicans fresh ammunition to reopen questions about the Clinton administration's counterterrorism record, which Republican critics maintain was lackluster at best after the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, in 1993.
Panetta was budget director and later chief of staff during the first Clinton term.
Considering the Republicans had the White House when the 9/11 hijackers came calling, of course -- and by most accounts sloughed off warnings headlined "Bin Laden determined to strike in US" -- there's only so far they can take that line of attack.
But if only one thing is clear from the Panetta nomination, it's this: President Obama intends to make a clear break with the intelligence policies and personnel of the Bush administration.
"Having served in Congress in the wake of Watergate and the domestic surveillance abuses that surfaced during the 1970s, Mr. Panetta understands how a democratic government should operate," said Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., a member of the House Intelligence Committee and chair of its oversight Panel since 2007.
"We need the CIA to collect reliable, actionable intelligence in ways that respect American values and honor the Constitution," Holt added.
"Mr. Panetta's background and reputation indicate he would serve the intelligence community, the President, and the country well."
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Comments
I think Panetta is a great choice. It is quite obvious that the cia has not done prescribed its job in many years and shows no sign of recovering anytime soon. The cia is a cozy country club that badly needs to be cleaned out or shut down and begun anew. Amateurs could not perform much worse than the "professionals".
Posted by: cjmcd
| January 6, 2009 8:48 AM
cjmcd thinks that Panetta is a 'great choice'? You don't see the PROBLEM with this appointment? How about, the next REPUBLICAN Administration naming KARLE ROVE, to the CIA? I betcha cjmcd would CRAP HIS PANTS if THAT happened. What is this? The Soviet Union? Leon Panetta is the 'POLITICAL OFFICER' on the RED OCTOBER. Remember the movie: The Hunt For Red October? The SOVIETS had a Political Officer on every ship. That's Panetta. He's not a SPY. He has no backround, or EXPERIENCE in the field. How come EVERYBODY-Caroline Kennedy, Leon Panetta, hell, even BARAK OBAMA, are QUAILIFIED for EVERYTHING, yet Sarah Palin, a two term GOVERNOR, was deemed not to be? Leon Panetta. SEIG HEIL! SEIG HEIL! SEIG HEIL! Idiot.
Posted by: Timothy L. Pennell
| January 6, 2009 9:02 AM
I think one need only look at recent events to see how politics is intelligence, the OSI and OSP for example, any intelligent person knew what product was desired and which way the winds blew, speaking of Rove.. he was close to the whole Libby Plame affair wasn't he?
I mean if we aren't bury calling Pakistan our ally in the GWOT we are publicly detailing in our elections under what circumstance we would attack terrorists inside that country.
At one point the Sunni was the "dead-ender" and then after put on the payroll, a "sheik alliance."
For all of you who pound the fists on politics, you seem to forget that a major portion of intelligence is exactly that, and that regime change peaceful is prefered to regime change forceful, but it is predominately about regime change or politics.
I see any real attempt to claim that these offices are not politicized ludicrous, they have always been.
And in closing events unseen and as of yet uncalculated will set the agenda, not some world-view that exists outside CIA norms.
Posted by: Dee Illuminati
| January 6, 2009 9:56 AM
This will take our intelligence capabilities back to the "Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail" era.
Posted by: Tzimtzum
| January 6, 2009 1:36 PM
This is one of three sensitive commentaries, the other two being Bloomberg and Christian Science Monitor. However, the whole story comes across as "ambulance chasing" journalism. Most CIA people, even the most senior, know nothing of the White House or Congress, and they cannot create a budget that has outcomes and return of investment factored in. I have real doubts about another "Master After God" at DNI *unless* his assignment isto eliminate the DNI all together and convert the new building to house CIA analysts while the management staffs of all of the disciplines are consolidated at Langley and forced to prove their value propositions against an Open Source Agency.
Panetta has held the two toughest jobs in the Executive--Director of OMB (which most commentators are over-looking) and Chief of Staff to the President. Obama is on the verge of making the same mistake Clinton did, leaving national security on auto-pilot. In fact, a revitalized CIA, an Open Source Agency, and unclassified decision support to OMB, each Cabinet Secretary and their Assistant Secretaries, and Congress, could pave the way for a major redirection of funds from war to peace and from pork to prosperity.
My more detailed comments including a two-page OpEd and a 16 page white paper are at www.oss.net/HILL, the last three entires also include my detailed critique of GLOBAL TRENDS 2025.
Posted by: Robert David STEELE Vivas
| January 6, 2009 4:26 PM
Was the "Curveball" fiasco a CIA problem, or a problem perpetuated by Doug Feith's Office of Special Plans? I thought I read that CIA had discredited Curveball as a source; yet, OSP continued to stovepipe his info to the White House.
Sorry to pick nits, but it feels an important point. It appears, in retrospect, that much of the "faulty" pre-war intelligence emanates from the Office of Special Plans.
Posted by: dqueue
| January 6, 2009 9:41 PM
dqueue is not picking nits, it seems that despite all the facts that there is a need to interpret them. I actually went over and read the OSI or OSS.net critique on trends 2005, and again it has to be interpreted or made sense of. Steele draws conclusions on say interest rates at the end of his critique that shows that he is filtering the information with his beliefs. In the example, usury is bad. You see the values with the analysis and critique as being very utilitarian and non nationalists.
OSP didn't need any facts when they had their convictions.
For the person in the trenches it is an assertion of there is many unsavory characters out there, few of them utilitarian or altristic, and that you shouldn't let a little evil prevent you from doing a great deal of good.
The frustration is with the concept, no good deed goes unpunished. Or to say, that risk aversion is preventing greater levels of success.
And then there is plain old stupid, I mean stupid.. as in a wrong headed policy being approved and knuckle draggers running amuck with it. I think Abhu Graib qualifies for stupid as an example, or waterboarding your star witness in allegations of WMD that you push over the DOS, or just plain old politics..
It sure is hell ain't easy, sure as hell ain't pretty, and be assured that not everybody wilol be happy with anybody chosen to fill the position.
You can even get directorate level terroritory pissing if you promote from within.
So I guess if the need is for a philosophy king to run an essentially dirty business, there is going to seem like nobody really fits the job.
Yeah still laughing.. no matter if it is the 93 bombing where DOJ supplied the explosives, OSP, or a bad economy.. CIA gets the blame. CIA if succesful doesn't trumpet a success, doesn't disclose a mistake, but gets blamed by everybody for everything up on the hill.
If your really intelligent you probably see through it all.
Posted by: Dee Illuminati
| January 7, 2009 12:31 PM
JEFF STEIN replies:
To dqueue: First I really appreciate your writing to me. I know it takes valuable time and thought to address such thorny issues -- and they are important ones.
Now, I've written a lot about Curveball. And you're right: Feith's people were pushing Curveball -- while knowing less about him than the CIA. But CIA was responsible for the source and his information.
Without reviewing every twist and turn in the plot, I'll revisit some details pertinent to the case that I've presented before.
On May 4, 2007, for example, I wrote a column in which former CIA Western Europe operations chief Tyler Drumheller recounted the agency's handling of Curveball. (See: "Tenet’s Version of Crucial Pre-Iraq Episode Is ‘a Lie,’ a Former Deputy Says," http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/hsnews110-000002505196.html).
“I can’t emphasize enough the violent nature of the debate [over Curveball] inside the agency,” Drumheller says. The e-mails were flying — between the CIA’s Berlin station and Washington, between the Clandestine Division’s doubters and the Intelligence Division’s believers, between Drumheller and the top aide to Tenet’s deputy John McLaughlin, between Drumheller and Tenet’s chief of staff — all through the fall.
“And if George wasn’t aware of it at that point,” in December 2002, Drumheller says — two months before Secretary of State Colin Powell’s fateful presentation of the (internally) discredited information to the United Nations — “then he’s derelict. Because his chief of staff is aware of it, the woman who was his special assistant is aware of it,” and others. “And there were all these e-mails about it,” cited by the Robb-Silverman Commission, which investigated U.S. intelligence failures relating to Iraq’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.
“These documents show that they and their staffers were well aware of the problems with Curveball,” Drumheller says. “In fact they knew before I got involved in September 2002.”
Then, a couple of weeks later, I wrote a column in which Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, recounted his dealings with the Curveball file. (See "Iraq Intelligence Horror Stories Shouldn’t Be Old News," http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/hsnews110-000002520554.html.)
Wilkerson said he “spent five of the most intimate days of my life, and five nights, without sleeping, as did my team, staring into . . . the face” of George Tenet, Tenet’s deputy John McLaughlin, and other top CIA officials working on Iraq, at the agency’s headquarters at Langley.
"It was the eve of Powell’s now infamous speech at the United Nations detailing Iraq’s alleged biological, chemical and nuclear programs," I wrote.
“One of the things Secretary Powell and I told Mr. Tenet and Mr. McLaughlin at the outset of our frenetic five or six days, trying to get ready for the U.N., was ‘multiple sources.’ We will not take anything and put it in this presentation, unless there are multiple, independently corroborated sources for the items we’re putting in the testimony,” Wilkerson said.
“That was the going-in position.”
Subsequently, he learned that there was but “a single source for the mobile biological laboratories; that his code name was Curveball; and that there were several very key dissents as to this individual’s testimony, during or before the preparation of the secretary of State.”
"Curveball, an Iraqi refugee, turned out to be a liar," I wrote.
And here's a key quote from Wilkerson relating to your point, dqueue:
“None of that, ladies and gentlemen, none of that was revealed to the secretary of State, or to me, or to any member of my team, by either John McLaughlin or George Tenet,” Wilkerson said.
"Tenet says in his memoir that he never heard of any serious questions about Curveball," I wrote.
"As readers of this column know , however, Tenet’s chief of European operations, Tyler Drumheller, insists he sent a flurry of warnings about Curveball to Tenet’s deputies."
As Wilkerson pointed out, both can’t be right.
“Either George Tenet is lying through his teeth, or Tyler Drumheller is lying through his teeth,” Wilkerson says, “with regard to one of the most important pillars of Secretary Powell’s presentation at the United Nations: the mobile biological laboratories.”
I hope that adds informative information to the discussion.-js
Posted by: Jeff Stein
| January 7, 2009 4:32 PM
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