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(El Baradei, continued.)

"And he was referring only to nuclear material," not weapons, she said.

Fleming then offered the IAEA's own translation of the relevant parts of the interview.

"What he would want emphasized are the caveats," she said, particularly ElBaradei's view that Iran could not secretly weaponize enriched uranium unless it withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty  and kicked out the IAEA inspectors

We found the IAEA's translation of ElBaradei's remarks incomprehensible in places, but you be the judge.

The Iranian file, or the so-called Iranian nuclear file, is complicated in the extreme. In order to understand it, the Iranian file is a vying for influence in the Middle East amongst Iran, which has its own ideology, the West and also the Arab world, which has a few ideologies that are different from Iran's. This issue is basically linked to the role of Iran, the role of the Arab world, the role of the West in the Middle East and the balances in it. The nuclear issue is a part of this. Iran has decided to resort to the uranium enrichment process. As we know, uranium enrichment is a basic part of nuclear weapon manufacture. It can be used for peaceful purposes...

The Al-Aribya interviewer, Elie Nakouzi, pushed ElBaradei to answer the question, "So how much time ...?"

"This varies, I cannot say," ElBaradei said, according to the IAEA translation.

But we should point out right away that Iran would have to leave the non-proliferation regime, which is the IAEA inspection system. This means so long as it submits to IAEA inspection it cannot enrich uranium to the high level needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon. Many people might not understand this. If Iran wanted to manufacture a nuclear weapon it would have to leave the non-proliferation regime, expel the IAEA inspectors and, after that, it would need at least.... depending on the number of existing enrichment devices and the quantity of uranium it has ....

The interviewer interrupted again: "How much time would it need?"

"At least 6 months to a year ..." El Baradei said.

That is, Iran will not be able to reach the point where we will get up in the morning and find that Iran has a nuclear weapon. It is necessary --

Interviewer: "Excuse me, but to make it clear to the viewers, Doctor, if Iran decided today to expel the IAEA from Iran it would need six months or a year --

"--or a year at least," ElBaradei said.

To enrich sufficient uranium to weapons grade, seems to be the point.

Memo to ElBaradei:  Speak clearly and carry a big stick.

All this comes amid another muddle: Iran's sudden conciliatory noises about nuclear negotiations.

Trita Parsi  took a closer look for the InterPress Service news agency, saying "Tehran's new tone has raised more suspicion than hope among cynics in Western capitals."

In typical fashion, Iran has sent contradictory signals. Iran's foreign minister struck an uncharacteristically conciliatory tone in New York, refusing to repeat Tehran's mantra that enrichment is non-negotiable. Days before, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati argued in favour of negotiations in an interview to the conservative daily, Jomhouriye Eslami.