Meanwhile, the same poll shows Giuliani trailing potential Democratic gubernatorial candidate Andrew Cuomo by a margin of 53-43 percent in a hypothetical 2010 contest for governor.

This backs up the argument I made in this piece yesterday, that Giuliani's apparent decision to pass on the Governor's race -- and give up a chance at a job for which he would be well suited, to run instead for a job that would likely drive him crazy -- is largely a function of his belief that he would have an easier time winning a contest for the U.S. Senate than for the governorship.

But I suggest exactly the opposite is true -- it's possible, if not likely, that one of the purposes of a run for the Senate would be to allow Giuliani to more quickly retire that remaining debt from his failed presidential campaign.

Candidates who lose have a notoriously difficult time raising funds to retire outstanding debt -- so much of the big money that's raised in politics today is done for transactional purposes, in the hopes of an implicit exchange (I'll give you money today, in the hope and belief that once you're in office, I will get a favor in return) down the road, that a candidate who has lost (and who, therefore, has no ability to offer, even implicitly, the prospect of a benefit to the donor down the road) finds it virtually impossible to raise funds.

But a candidate with prospects of a victory down the road -- even a failed presidential candidate, who is now merely considering a run for the Senate -- ah, that candidate has prospects of being able to offer the implicit deal to prospective donors: Help me retire my debt, and then write me a check for my Senate campaign, and I'll be able to do you some good when I win.

Am I suggesting that Rudy Giuliani is about to run for the Senate so he can retire his presidential campaign debt? No, that would be silly. And I've already used up my silly quota on matters Giuliani yesterday, when I raised the possibility that Giuliani might be running for the Senate in 2010 as a means to run for the presidency again in 2012.

Well, okay, maybe that idea isn't that silly, after all -- because there's still no other reason that makes more sense to explain why Giuliani would run for a Senate seat that will drive him batty, and will force him to turn right around and run for a full term just two years later.

But here's the key -- if you want to know how serious Rudy Giuliani is about running for the Senate in 2010, and/or running for president in 2012, watch closely to see how he approaches that outstanding $1.7 million campaign debt. If he's serious about running, you'll be hearing about Giuliani debt retirement fundraisers in the coming weeks.

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Consider: Earlier this afternoon, New York newspapers went gaga over reports that, first, Giuliani had informed political allies he would not run for governor in 2010, and second, that he would run for the Senate instead, against freshman Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand.

Now consider: Giuliani, the ultimate alpha male, is a chief executive. Decision-making is his greatest talent; thoughtful deliberation, not so much. Rapidly assessing options, making decisions, and then taking action is his stock in trade; pondering over weighty arguments, or even engaging in debate, is ... not something for which he is well known.

Moreover, raising money for a campaign for governor of New York would be far, far easier for Giuliani than would raising money for a Senate race -- which, after all, is regulated by federal law, with a relatively low individual maximum contribution, while a governor's contest is regulated by far looser state-level fundraising restrictions.

He wouldn't.

That is, he wouldn't, if he actually wanted to do the job to which he was elected.

If he was making a choice based solely on which job -- governor or senator -- he would prefer, he would, no doubt, choose to run for governor.

Yet, if this afternoon's news reports are accurate, Giuliani will shortly announce a run for the Senate instead of a run for governor -- and not only that, but if the news reports are accurate, he's planning a run for a partial term that will only last two years, where winning the race in 2010 would immediately mean he would have to begin raising money for a second contest for a full term in 2012.

Raising money for not one, but two statewide contests in New York under federal campaign finance restrictions would be a daunting task, even for a man of Giuliani's proven fundraising prowess.

This can only mean one thing -- the choice to run for Senate instead of governor wasn't made based on the service to come, but on the election to be won.

Running a race for governor would mean a primary fight against former Rep. Rick Lazio, and a likely fall matchup against Democrat Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.

Running Senate race, on the other hand, would simply mean a cakewalk to the nomination, followed by a contest against the still relatively unknown Gillibrand next fall.

Gillibrand or Cuomo -- which would you prefer to challenge, were you in Giuliani's shoes?

Well, if serving in the Senate would drive an action-oriented man like Giuliani crazy, why in the world would he run for the seat?

To prove a point -- that he's a winner.

So Giuliani makes the decision to run for the Senate, for the simple reason that he needs to re-establish himself in the minds of GOP voters nationwide, and the political class as a whole, as a winner.

But why would he need to prove himself as a winner?

He would only need to re-establish himself as a winner if he had another, larger, purpose down the road -- and that purpose can only be, must only be, a race for president in 2012.

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One of the things that's always bothered me most about political journalism is when media types make a mistake, honest or otherwise, but then refuse to acknowledge and correct it when it's called to their attention. As a guy who used to get paid to, among other things, track what the media was saying on a regular basis, it drove me crazy when I found mistakes in copy about my candidates -- but failed to get the reporter to fix the mistake properly.

On Tuesday night, I made an error as I was preparing a piece on the count of absentee ballots in NY23. It wasn't a particularly sophisticated error -- in fact, it was a simple error of transposition, in which I inadvertently turned a 1 into a 7 and a 7 into a 1. Unfortunately, those inadvertently switched numbers formed the basis for what became the blog post below, suggesting that Doug Hoffman just might get mighty close to recount territory.

The difference in the candidates' totals was 3,176. With the transposed numbers back in their proper place, I can safely project that in order even to get into recount range, Doug Hoffman would need a miracle far larger than the Miracle on Ice I referenced.

I want to thank the two faithful readers who brought the mistake to my attention for doing so in such a gracious way.

What follows is the original blog post, error intact:

Calling Al Michaels -- New York 23 May Need You

If the rest of the yet-to-be-counted absentee ballots go the way the first three counties' results do, we're in for a recount in the special election in New York's 23rd Congressional District.

When the day began, there were 7,419 absentee ballots whose votes had not yet been added to the candidates' totals, and the gap separating Conservative Party candidate Doug Hoffman from Democratic Party candidate Bill Owens was a paltry 3,716 votes.

By mid-afternoon, three counties had tabulated their results:

In Oneida County, Hoffman picked up 446 votes, Owens picked up 219, and GOP nominee Dede Scozzafava picked up 97.

In Hamilton County, Hoffman picked up 85 votes, Owens picked up 60, and Scozzafava picked up 87.

So in these three first three counties to report their results, Hoffman picked up 47 percent of the absentee ballot vote, while Owens picked up about 32.5 percent, and Scozzafava picked up roughly 20.5 percent.

Adding the results to what was released after last week's recanvass -- the one that showed the gap between Hoffman and Owens at 3,716 votes, instead of the election night reported margin of more than 5,000 -- and Owens' margin over Hoffman has shrunk to just 2,957 votes, with 5,930 absentee ballots left to be counted.

Hoffman is gaining fast -- he cut Owens' margin by 759 votes, out of the 1,489 counted.

That's a slightly better than 1 out of 2 conversation ratio -- but with fewer than 6,000 votes left to be counted, and the gap still at just under 3,000 votes, it may not be enough for Hoffman to pull it out.

But it likely will be close enough for a full recount.

Through the course of the contest, Hoffman liked to point out that he was the chief financial officer of the 1980 Lake Placid Olympics -- the Winter Olympics immortalized by the U.S. Hockey team's improbable upset-for-the-ages victory over the Soviet Union in the semifinal game. "Do you believe in miracles?" asked Al Michaels, in one of the most famous sports calls of all time.

It's still too early to make the call, but perhaps it would be prudent for Hoffman to get hold of Michaels' phone number. He just might be needed for a replay.

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The issue? The Obama administration's decision to try Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other alleged Sept. 11 plotters in New York City.

Interviewed last night, Paterson indicated he's not a fan of Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.'s decision to hold the trial in lower Manhattan: "This is not a decision that I would have made ... New York was very much the epicenter of that attack," Paterson said. "It's very painful; we're still having trouble getting over it. We still haven't been able to rebuild that site, and having those terrorists tried so close to the attack is going to be an encumbrance on all ... New Yorkers."

Standing up to the Obama administration isn't something most Democrats feel all that comfortable doing. Yet.

So why would Paterson publicly break with Obama?

That is, Obama has already broken with Paterson; what's Paterson got to lose?

Then go here, to the release of a new Siena Research Institute poll showing Paterson trailing New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo by a 75 percent-16 percent margin in a hypothetical 2010 gubernatorial primary contest.

That is, Paterson's already running 60 points behind in a prospective 2010 gubernatorial primary; what's Paterson got to lose?

Bolstering Paterson's opposition -- and the means to turn that opposition into a political strategy that could get him closer to being back in the game -- are the results of a new Marist Poll released today.

Asked if they thought holding the trial of five alleged terrorists in Manhattan was a "good idea" or a "bad idea," New York City residents split -- 45 percent thought it was a good idea, 41 percent thought it was a bad idea, 14 percent weren't sure. Among registered voters, the numbers were exactly the same.

When broken down by party identification among registered voters in the survey, 48 percent of Democrats thought it was a good idea, while just 39 percent thought it a bad idea; just 23 percent of Republicans thought it a good idea, while 68 percent thought it a bad idea; and among non-enrolled voters, 48 percent thought it a good idea, against 36 percent who thought it a bad idea.

So, if Democrats think it's a good idea by a 48 percent to 39 percent margin, how could Paterson use his opposition to get closer to being back in the game?

It's all in the crosstabs.

It's not enough just to look at the party ID number and make a determination -- you have to look inside the survey, at the crosstabs.

Break down the survey by household income, race, sex, and age. And before we take a look at that breakdown, let's stop for a moment and think about likely coalitions in a New York Democratic primary pitting Cuomo against Paterson -- Paterson's coalition will be younger, poorer, and less white, while Cuomo's coalition will be older, better off, and whiter.

Now let's look at the crosstabs, and see what we can see.

First, among those with a household income of more than $50,000, 47 percent think it's a good idea, against 43 percent who oppose it.

Whites think it's a bad idea, 49 percent to 41 percent.

And there's a definite correlation between age and opposition -- those younger than 35 favor the idea, by 51 percent to 39 percent; those 35-54 favor it by just 44 percent to 38 percent; but those over 55 oppose it, by 46 percent to 41 percent.

And while the survey doesn't show it, it's a good bet that those who oppose the decision are a lot more intense about their opposition than are those who support the decision.

So, based on the crosstabs, opposition to the decision to hold terror trials in Manhattan is strongest among the better off, whiter, older segment of the population -- in other words, Cuomo's coalition.

Paterson's opposition to holding the terror trials in Manhattan could, if used properly, be just the wedge he needs to break up Cuomo's coalition.

Of course, to use it properly, Paterson would have to raise tons of money in order to be able to turn Cuomo's coalition against him, and he'd have to further benefit from a Cuomo decision to engage on the issue.

So, is opposition to holding terror trials enough to win Paterson a tough primary against Cuomo? Likely not. But when you're a drowning man, just about anything looks like a life jacket.

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A White House envoy was dispatched to New Jersey to conduct conversations with potential replacement candidates, including State Senate President Dick Codey.

This revelation follows by about six weeks the revelation that the Obama political operation went through the same calculation regarding embattled New York Gov. David A. Paterson -- except that in the case of Paterson, the White House went so far as to actually inform the governor that it was the president's desire that he abandon his bid for election.

Embattled Democratic incumbents, take heed -- when your receptionist buzzes you and says, "Sir, it's Patrick Gaspard calling," you may want to find a way to duck the call, and then figure out what kind of favor you can do for Obama before returning it.

And one further note to embattled Democratic incumbents -- if Barack Obama's political operation will consider throwing a multi-gajillionaire former Goldman Sachs CEO governor overboard just because he's running behind his challenger, just how little regard do you think they'll have for you?

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Camden, Essex, and Hudson counties -- home to Camden, Newark, and Jersey City, respectively -- are considered the three corners of the Democratic stool in New Jersey.

Together, they typically provide a Democratic candidate running for statewide office a 140,000-vote cushion.

But Christie decided early on to make a play for the votes of these city dwellers, based largely on shared support for increased educational opportunity for inner city children trapped in failing schools.

"You'll know if we won on election night not by how much we win Ocean and Sussex by," senior Christie strategist Mike DuHaime told the reporter, naming Republican strongholds in the outer suburbs, "but how much do we lose Hudson, Essex and Camden by."

So, did the gambit work?

On the basis of voter returns and exit polls, no, it didn't.

According to the Edison exit poll for CNN, the defeated incumbent, Jon Corzine won 88 percent of the votes cast by African-Americans in New Jersey, while Christie won the votes of just 9 percent. Those numbers track almost exactly with the typical Democrat-Republican split among African-Americans in New Jersey as seen in previous elections.

Perhaps more surprisingly, Christie's focus on the cities didn't do anything to drive up his numbers there, compared to average GOP efforts in the cities -- in fact, he pulled about 23,000 fewer votes out of those three counties than did the average Republican gubernatorial candidate over the previous four elections (out of which Republicans won two and lost two).

In Camden, Christie pulled 49,136 votes, about 2,000 votes more than did the average GOP gubernatorial candidate -- that's about 4 percent better than average.

But in Essex, Christie pulled 47,146 votes, about 13,500 votes fewer than did the average GOP gubernatorial candidate -- that's about 22 percent worse than average.

And in Hudson, Christie pulled just 29,301 votes, about 12,000 votes fewer than did the average GOP gubernatorial candidate -- that's about 29 percent worse than average.

But wait. We know Corzine didn't do nearly as well around the state, including in typical Democratic strongholds, as did the average Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

Perhaps, despite Christie's pulling lower numbers in Camden, Essex, and Hudson than did the average Republican, Corzine's own numbers were so much lower than they should have been that DuHaime's prediction was true anyway?

Not so.

Corzine definitely underperformed, against the average Democratic gubernatorial candidate of the previous four elections.

But not in two of these three key counties -- at least not judging by his margin of victory over Christie, as compared to the average margin of victory on a county-by-county basis.

In Essex, for instance, Corzine's margin of victory over Christie was 64,808 votes. That's larger than the standard 63,854-vote Democratic margin.

And in Hudson, Corzine's margin of victory over Christie was 46,844 votes. That's larger than the standard 42,050-vote Democratic margin.

Only in Camden did Corzine's margin of victory over Christie not match the standard -- for Corzine, Camden provided only a 17,730-vote margin, where it typically provides the Democratic candidate a 35,439-vote margin.

So despite what DuHaime told the New York Times reporter in June about their inner-city strategy, Christie actually lost Essex, Hudson, and Camden by about 23,000 votes more than did the average GOP candidate of the previous four cycles.

Yet Christie defeated Corzine statewide by more than 100,000 votes.

How?

By setting records for Republican votes produced in GOP strongholds -- like the afore-mentioned Sussex and Ocean.

In Sussex, Christie produced 31,665 votes -- that's about 6,000 votes more than the typical GOP candidate, representing a 23 percent increase.

Meanwhile, Corzine's vote total in Sussex was just 12,849, about 600 votes fewer than the typical Democratic candidate, representing a 5 percent decrease.

Put them together, and Christie's Sussex margin -- 18,816 votes -- was about 54 percent higher than normal.

But it was in Ocean County that the Christie numbers blew up the spreadsheets.

In Ocean County, over the previous four elections, the Democratic candidate had averaged 73,142 votes, and the Republican candidate had averaged 86,065 votes, to create an average GOP margin of victory of 12,923 votes.

But in Ocean County on Tuesday, Christie captured 123,882 votes -- almost 38,000 votes higher than the typical Republican candidate, representing a 44 percent increase.

Corzine, meanwhile, won just 53,628 votes -- almost 20,000 votes fewer than the typical Democrat, representing a 27 percent decrease.

Consequently, Christie's margin of victory in Ocean County -- 70,254 votes -- was about four and a half times higher than normal.

And in Monmouth County -- a GOP stronghold never mentioned by DuHaime -- Christie did even better.

In Monmouth County, over the previous four elections, the Democratic candidate had averaged 84,532 votes, and the Republican had averaged 101,978 votes, to create an average GOP margin of victory of 17,445 votes.

But in Monmouth County on Tuesday, Christie won 128,328 votes -- more than 26,000 votes more than the typical GOP candidate, representing a 26 percent increase.

Corzine, meanwhile, won just 64,315 votes -- more than 20,000 votes fewer than the typical Democrat, representing a 24 percent decrease.

So Christie's margin of victory in Monmouth County -- 64,013 votes -- was about two and a half times higher than average.

Christie's margin of victory in the two shore counties more than made up for his combined losses in Camden, Essex, and Hudson.

The pattern repeats in other areas known in New Jersey as GOP strongholds -- Warren, Hunterdon, Morris, Cape May and Somerset Counties all saw Christie's vote totals rise significantly as compared to the average, while Corzine's vote totals fell significantly.

Christie didn't win by competing successfully for inner-city votes. He won by rolling up massive margins in GOP base areas.

The question now is, was this part of the plan all along -- in which case DuHaime's statement to the New York Times reporter was part of a clever subterfuge, a bit of strategic deception worthy of Sun Tzu?

Or did it just happen that way?

Only DuHaime and a few others know for sure. And I'm betting they're not talking.

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Their gripe? Barack Obama's final-weekend visit to Camden to shore up the faltering campaign of Democrat Gov. Jon Corzine.

The Obama motorcade shut down the Walt Whitman Bridge -- the principal artery between South Jersey and Philadelphia -- and sections of Interstate 42 yesterday afternoon, long in advance of Obama's scheduled 12:55 PM arrival at the Philadelphia airport.

The Eagles had 13 points on the board before there were four minutes gone in the game -- and before those thousands of fans had even arrived at the stadium, thanks to the Obama motorcade.

Most of them, in fact, hadn't been seated by halftime, by which point the Eagles were up by a score of 30-7.

And just how many Camden Democrats were there in the Susquehanna Bank Center for Obama to fire up? According to Corzine's staff, it was but a paltry 6,500 -- and if the Corzine staff is spinning there were 6,500, it's a good bet there were really only a few thousand in attendance.

That's likely far, far fewer than the number of Eagles and Giants fans stranded by Obama's motorcade.

Of such trivial-but-not-insignificant are close elections won ... and lost.

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