Richard Holbrooke, President Obama's special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, arrived in Kabul on Thursday, the day after the Taliban pulled off coordinated attacks in the Afghan capital that killed at least 27 people.
Afghanistan is a mess. And by most accounts, it's heading in the wrong direction. Yesterday, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said that the Obama administration was in the middle of a review of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy "that's ongoing over the course of the next 60 days or so, to reevaluate where we are." He also confirmed that within a "couple of days" Obama would be making a decision about sending more troops to Afghanistan. (This could entail adding up to three brigades, about 16,000 troops.)
More troops before the review process is completed? That seems odd.
Moreover, at his first presidential press conference on Monday night, Obama noted that the national government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai is "detached." This raises an obvious question about the review process: what will it come up with regarding Karzai? Can the US spend billions of dollars in Iraq and send more troops there, if the government it is trying to help is "detached"?
As the Afghanistan war becomes more a subject of national discourse--and you do see it drawing some attention on cable news--it's important that the debate not be limited to more troops versus less troops. Obama is going to have to explain what we're doing there and what are the measurable aims. What defines victory--or not-a-loss--in Afghanistan? Remember Donald Rumsfeld's metrics?
Anyone who wants to think clearly about Afghanistan ought to check out a recent report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Here's a brief summation of its main argument:
The debate in Washington and European capitals has recently centered on how many more troops will be sent to Afghanistan in 2009 as part of a military surge. Such a tactical adjustment is unlikely to make much of a difference in a country where the basic population-to-troops ratio is estimated at approximately 430 people per foreign soldier.
The real question is how combat troops should be used. The two choices we face are whether to continue playing offense by going after the Taliban, especially in the south and the east, and spreading troops thin; or whether to adopt a new strategy focusing on protecting strategic sites, namely, urban centers and key roads, to allow for the development of a strong core of Afghan institutions.
The reports main conclusions are sobering:
* Objectives in Afghanistan must be reconciled with the resources available to pursue them.
* The mere presence of foreign soldiers fighting a war in Afghanistan is probably the single most important factor in the resurgence of the Taliban.
* The best way to weaken, and perhaps divide, the armed opposition is to reduce military confrontations.
* The main policy objective should be to leave an Afghan government that is able to survive a U.S. withdrawal.
* Strategy should differentiate three areas and allocate resources accordingly: strategic cities and transportation routes that must be under total Afghan/alliance control; buffers around strategic areas, where NATO and the Afghan Army would focus their struggle against insurgents; and opposition territory, where NATO and Afghan forces would not expend effort or resources.
* Withdrawal will allow the United States to focus on the central security problem in the region: al-Qaeda and the instability in Pakistan.
In other words, this is not a war to win. It's a war to finish--and that will only happen through nonmilitary means. So forget about surging and think about developing social structures and capital. That's not going to be easy either. But lowered expectations and realistic assessments may be what's needed regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that 60-day review process will produce both.
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Comments
DC,
"In other words, this is not a war to win. It's a war to finish"
I hope Barack realizes that fact. If not it will be LBJ and Vietnam all over again.
Maybe an anti-war candidate will challenge Obama in 2012 from the left side? THAT might get interesting if Obama hasn't made the decision to get us and NATO out of that mess.
Posted by: capt
| February 12, 2009 2:29 PM
Security is certainly one issue. But, with an economy that is largely dependent on the poppy production and the opium trade (supplying an estimated 90+ percent of the world's opium), Afghanistan's future seems firmly rooted in a long-term struggle between the two forces that have been profiting from this trade -- the Taliban and the regional/tribal drug lords. Not a great choice.
Changing the ecomony over time to something more sustainable -- and building the institutions to support it -- might offer a better future to the Afghan people. But, does America really want to bear that burden and cost, especially if it has to go it largely alone and especially in the midst of a severe economic crisis?
It seems to me that is the question that Obama will have to figure out.
Posted by: Antidote
| February 12, 2009 4:47 PM
what is he going to do in afghanistan?
the very first thing that he did after becoming the US prez was to order a bombing on Pakistan.
oops! many innocent civilians were killed!
who cares about that though, they are merely brown skinned muslims!
Posted by: as_if!
| February 12, 2009 10:14 PM
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