The headline was boring, but not the material.
"Intelligence Boosters," the headline read, at the bottom of page 11 of the Sunday New York Times' "Week in Review" section.
"This is the article I never intended to write," began Art Brown, a 25-year CIA veteran and head of the Asia division of the agency's clandestine service from 2003 to 2005.
But then Brown went on to excoriate his former employer's performance in its main mission: human intelligence.
"If the CIA's human spy arm was operating as a private business, it would be running at a loss. Think Detroit, not 007," Brown wrote.
"In my years in the agency, I cannot recall a single case where anyone was fired for failing to perform. I cannot even remember anyone being demoted. There is simply no job-threatening penalty for mediocrity."
CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano suggested that Brown was out of touch with the agency.
"Because a constant drive for improvement is a defining feature of American intelligence," Gimigliano said by e-mail. "I wouldn't assume that Art's piece--drawn in part from his service here, which ended a few years ago--reflects what's going on at CIA today. Intelligence work can change quickly, and it has."
But Brown had anticipated the CIA would question the currency of his information about the agency's performance.
"How can I know this, three years out of touch with the secret stuff?" he asked in his piece. "The answer is rather simple: because Osama bin Laden is still the head of Al Qaeda. And no one has been held accountable for failing to catch him."
Brown also sprinkled the piece with a couple of embarrassing tidbits.
* "Despite their reputation as plugged-in experts on other countries, many C.I.A. officers do not even have Internet access at their desks. Worse yet, they don't think they need it."
* "C.I.A. spies reported on several occasions that Al Qaeda had plans to attack American military bases overseas -- in countries that a quick Web search would have shown had no such bases."
Brown's prescription for Obama's CIA? Get outside help.
"If you want to find answers to the hardest questions, why not reach broadly into the expertise of the country and assemble the best spy team possible?"
To analyze rogue nuclear programs, for example, "it would probably mean including a few engineers who build our own bombs. They could make sure you understand the missing parts of the puzzle and how those parts may be hidden."
Brown also suggested the CIA dust off some tools it had used during the Cold War (which came under harsh criticism when they were revealed by the left-wing muckraking Ramparts magazine in the 1970s).
"Good freelance reporters know how to find sources to fill in a hard story," Brown wrote.
"The expertise of academia, where decades of insight often go untouched, could be balanced with a seasoned detective or tough prosecutor adept at turning a crook. The more military the topic, the more military folks you would want on its pursuit."
But for God's sake, don't hire these people, Brown advised. Make them temps. Otherwise, they'll just turn into more of the brown-nosing bureaucrats the agency is already infected with.
