Results tagged “Obama transition” from SpyTalk

Am I the only person who sees some irony in the demands of some key Democrats that Steve Kappes be kept at the CIA as the price of their support for Leon Panetta to run the spy agency?

To be sure, Kappes, now the CIA's No. 2, is "highly regarded," as everyone keeps saying, inside and outside the CIA. He has been a station chief in Moscow and Kuwait and in recent years pulled off a Hollywood-like secret operation to get Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi  to ditch his nuclear weapons program. His subordinates virtually gush over him.

He has been called "the best spy to emerge from the CIA in a generation."

Former CIA operative Gary Berntsen, who led one of the first teams into Afghanstan, said Kappes is "probably the finest man I've worked for in my career.  You would know what he wanted from you but it was clear that people would have the flexibility and the lattitide to make those difficult decisions on your own, which is  what we need."

But if the choice of Panetta is meant to signal a complete break with the Bush administration's CIA, why would Democrats like Sen. Diane Feinstein, D-Calif., the incoming chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, intimate that her price for supporting Obama's pick of Panetta was to keep Kappes as his deputy?

One reason is obvious: Outside of listening in on intelligence briefings as Bill Clinton's chief of staff, and reviewing CIA spreadsheets as OMB director, Panetta can't seriously be said to have "intelligence experience," no matter how furious the Obama team's spinning.

But Panetta's reputation as a top-notch manager is unchallenged. Wags joke that he was the first adult to join the Clinton White House in 1994 and clamp down on the dorm-like late-night bull sessions that passed as staff meetings. The idea is that he'll bring intellectual, organizational and fiscal rigor to a CIA badly in need of it, while Kappes rides herd on the spies.
 
But will Kappes be Panetta's loyal consigliore, or double-dealing protector of the way things are?
 
Can he be said to be the new leader's agent of "change," implementing a break from the agency's record as obedient servant on water-boarding, secret extraditions to foreign dungeons and warrantless wiretapping? 

Kappes' resistance to the regime of Porter J. Goss, the Florida Republican congressman Bush chose to run the agency in 2004, is notorious.

But Goss' defenders maintain that the public never got the whole story.

"He was certainly a good ops officer," a former top CIA official during the Goss era, which ended in 2006 with a near mutiny in the operations ranks, said of Kappes.

"It wasn't that that we had a problem with that, it was his management," the official said, saying Kappes had repeatedly ignored pleas by Goss' imported congressional staff -- derided as the "Gosslings" -- to find someone to head the agency's New York office during a heightened terrorist alert against the city.  

The lionization of Kappes among ops veterans at the CIA still rankles some officials from that era, who think Goss got a raw deal.

"I would say that if Kappes is kept on," said one, still bitter,  "Panetta will need to watch out for the first time he crosses him.  There will be more nasty leaks and innuendo and 'experienced' officers leaving in a huff."

Many close observers of the agency have cautioned that Panetta should avoid bringing along an outside retinue to staff his executive offices at Langley, like Goss did when he imported his staff from the House Intelligence Committee, where he was chairman.

For that reason alone, Feinstein and others say Panetta needs "experienced intelligence professionals" to show him the ropes.

But even one of Kappes's many admirers thinks not.

"They need someone with experience but who is not associated with the last few years," offered this person, a senior CIA manager during the reign of George Tenet. "Steve or anyone else from the current group will waste a ton of time explaining why what they have done is good."  

But another official who had a box seat at CIA during the Goss stint suggests another, darker reason for keeping Kappes on: Finding someone else could be the NFL fielding replacement players during the strike years back.

When Goss came in, "Talented officers refused to take on leadership roles simply because they were annoyed that their choice for DCI, John McLaughlin, was not chosen by the President," he said. 

Which all means Panetta is going to get a quick education in the CIA's culture even before he turns to the Global War on Terror.

Panetta, argues another official from the Goss era, "is doomed with this arrangement, one way or the other. 

"He should be insisting, if 'change' is really what the Obama administration wants at CIA, that he gets to clean house," the official said.

"Otherwise, he will be managing and working against cross purposes with those who carried out the very policies they believe to be inhumane and improper."

Feinstein press secretary Phil LaVelle said the senator is confident that national security officials in the Obama administration will dictate a break from Bush-era practices at the CIA. 

"Senator Feinstein is quite clear that the abuses of the past were illegal and unacceptable, and she's introduced legislation to prevent them from occurring in the future," Lavelle said in a response to a query. 

"Senator Feinstein also expects that President-elect Obama will dictate changes from the past, and she expects any CIA director to carry out that direction."
In light of CIA Director Michael V. Hayden's virtual plea to be kept on in the Obama administration, it's interesting to look back at a similar instance in 1976, when George H.W. Bush tried to get President-elect Jimmy Carter to retain him as his spy chief.

Carter loved the CIA briefings he had been getting during his campaign against President Gerald R. Ford, according to the agency's official history of presidential transitions.

Sometimes the sessions, which usually took place at his modest home in Plains, Ga., went on for six hours.

"Carter was a very careful and interested listener and an active participant," writes longtime CIA official John L. Helgerson, the study's author.

"All who were present remember that he asked a great many questions, often in minute detail. He was especially interested in the nature of the Intelligence Community's evidence, including satellite photography of deployed Soviet weapons."

Later, after winning the election, Carter "seemed to enjoy and benefit from the substantive discussions held at Blair House during his visits to Washington in the transition period."

Not so, though, when Bush, a future president himself, came to Plains looking to keep his job as DCI.

Carter was cold, Helgerson writes.

"Carter was unambiguous in his response after Bush finished his discussion of the pros and cons of his staying on as Director. The DCI had finished with an observation that -- all things considered -- he probably should be replaced. The President-elect, according to Bush, 'simply said, okay, or something like this, with no discussion, no questions about any of the points I had made.... As in the rest of the briefing, Carter was very cold or cool, no editorializing, no niceties, very business-like."

During their talk, Bush described "more than a dozen sensitive CIA programs and issues" for Carter, the CIA history says.

In contrast to the lively sessions he'd been having with his regular CIA briefers, "Carter had virtually no comment and asked no questions during the whole session" with Bush, the CIA history says.

"He had not indicated whether he thought the operations were good or bad, or that he was surprised or not surprised. He asked for no follow-up action or information. Bush commented that Carter 'seemed a little impatient, he didn't say much but seemed to be a little turned off. He tended to moralize.'"
The former Navy submarine nuclear officer found some CIA operations not to his liking, according to the CIA history.

"In fact, Carter was 'turned off' and uncomfortable with many of the Agency's sensitive collection programs. He ordered some discontinued ..."

Carter's running mate, Minnesota Sen. Walter Mondale, tried to break the tension by complimenting Bush on his handling of the agency in the wake of a rash of revelations about CIA assassination plots and domestic spying carried out by his predecessors, "rather generously (saying) that things had gotten better since I'd been there."

But the three quickly moved on to "a discussion of the timing of the announcement of a new CIA Director-designate."

One of the reasons Carter cited for removing Bush, who had been a Republican congressman before being appointed as ambassador to the U.N. and later China by President Nixon, was that he wanted to "depoliticize" the CIA directorship.

Subsequently, "senior Agency officers later found it ironic that his first choice for CIA Director was Theodore Sorensen, the former Kennedy political adviser and speechwriter," Helgerson writes.

Sorensen was forced to withdraw his name within weeks of his nomination "because of mounting criticism that he had played a very political role in the [John F.] Kennedy administration."  His membership in a Harvard socialist club during the Great Depression also drew fire.

Sorenson was replaced by Adm. Stansfield Turner, whom many Agency veterans consider one of the worst CIA directors in its history, mostly because he fired legions of covert operatives in favor of greater reliance on technological means of spying, such as satellites.

Sorenson may have missed a bullet, his reputation sealed as a speech writer,  rather than soiled as a spy master.

Once referred to by Kennedy as his "intellectual blood bank," wrote probably the most famous line ever in a presidential inauguration: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Within months, Kennedy fired his CIA director, Allen W. Dulles, following the Bay of Pigs disaster.
In light of CIA Director Michael V. Hayden's virtual plea to be kept on in the Obama administration, it's interesting to look back at a similar instance in 1976, when George H.W. Bush tried to get President-elect Jimmy Carter to retain him as his spy chief.

Carter loved the CIA briefings he had been getting during his campaign against President Gerald R. Ford, according to the agency's official history of presidential transitions.

Sometimes the sessions, which usually took place at his modest home in Plains, Ga., went on for six hours.

"Carter was a very careful and interested listener and an active participant," writes longtime CIA official John L. Helgerson, the study's author.

"All who were present remember that he asked a great many questions, often in minute detail. He was especially interested in the nature of the Intelligence Community's evidence, including satellite photography of deployed Soviet weapons."

Later, after winning the election, Carter "seemed to enjoy and benefit from the substantive discussions held at Blair House during his visits to Washington in the transition period."

Not so, though, when Bush, a future president himself, came to Plains looking to keep his job as DCI.

Carter was cold, Helgerson writes.

"Carter was unambiguous in his response after Bush finished his discussion of the pros and cons of his staying on as Director. The DCI had finished with an observation that -- all things considered -- he probably should be replaced. The President-elect, according to Bush, 'simply said, okay, or something like this, with no discussion, no questions about any of the points I had made.... As in the rest of the briefing, Carter was very cold or cool, no editorializing, no niceties, very business-like."

During their talk, Bush described "more than a dozen sensitive CIA programs and issues" for Carter, the CIA history says.

In contrast to the lively sessions he'd been having with his regular CIA briefers, "Carter had virtually no comment and asked no questions during the whole session" with Bush, the CIA history says.

"He had not indicated whether he thought the operations were good or bad, or that he was surprised or not surprised. He asked for no follow-up action or information. Bush commented that Carter 'seemed a little impatient, he didn't say much but seemed to be a little turned off. He tended to moralize.'"
The former Navy submarine nuclear officer found some CIA operations not to his liking, according to the CIA history.

"In fact, Carter was 'turned off' and uncomfortable with many of the Agency's sensitive collection programs. He ordered some discontinued ..."

Carter's running mate, Minnesota Sen. Walter Mondale, tried to break the tension by complimenting Bush on his handling of the agency in the wake of a rash of revelations about CIA assassination plots and domestic spying carried out by his predecessors, "rather generously (saying) that things had gotten better since I'd been there."

But the three quickly moved on to "a discussion of the timing of the announcement of a new CIA Director-designate."

One of the reasons Carter cited for removing Bush, who had been a Republican congressman before being appointed as ambassador to the U.N. and later China by President Nixon, was that he wanted to "depoliticize" the CIA directorship.

Subsequently, "senior Agency officers later found it ironic that his first choice for CIA Director was Theodore Sorensen, the former Kennedy political adviser and speechwriter," Helgerson writes.

Sorensen was forced to withdraw his name within weeks of his nomination "because of mounting criticism that he had played a very political role in the [John F.] Kennedy administration."  His membership in a Harvard socialist club during the Great Depression also drew fire.

Sorenson was replaced by Adm. Stansfield Turner, whom many Agency veterans consider one of the worst CIA directors in its history, mostly because he fired legions of covert operatives in favor of greater reliance on technological means of spying, such as satellites.

But Sorenson may have missed a bullet, his reputation sealed as a speech writer,  rather than soiled as a spy master.

Once referred to by Kennedy as his "intellectual blood bank," Sorenson wrote probably the most famous line ever in a presidential inauguration: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Within months, Kennedy fired his CIA director, Allen W. Dulles, following the Bay of Pigs disaster.
Adm. Dennis C. Blair, the former Pacific forces commander who once coordinated military operations at the CIA, is still on tap to become the nation's next top intelligence officer, despite an unexplained delay of an official announcement from President-elect Obama, sources familiar with the process say.

Blair has been touted as a shoe-in for the nomination by unnamed congressional and other anonymous sources.

But weeks have passed since his name first surfaced as a cinch for the Obama administration's director of National Intelligence.

Even in the absence of a formal announcement, however, Blair is being prepped for confirmation hearings on his expected nomination.

 "I know he's being prepared for his hearing," said a top former intelligence official, who also asked for anonymity in exchange for talking freely about the process.  

In contrast, the president-elect's national security team has had trouble finding an appropriate candidate to become the CIA's next chief.

One knowledgeable source said that the Obama team was "back to zero" on finding a CIA chief, an assertion rejected by a transition official.

Running the spy agency has become less attractive to personalities who once might have sought the position, sources say, ever since it was subsumed by the new national intelligence directorate (ODNI), set up after the surprise 9/11 attacks.  

"A lot of people don't want the job," said the source, because the CIA chief is no longer top dog in the fractious, 16-agency intelligence community, and no longer gives the President his daily briefing.  The Obama team has gone down "some blind alleys" in finding the right person, the source said.

Whereas in pre-9/11 times the job might have been a springboard to bigger things, now "it's a career ender" because it requires direct supervision of such contentious policies as renditions and interrogations.

"You've got to just really love it," a former top CIA official said,  "because it's too painful otherwise."

In 1995, Blair was appointed associate director of the CIA for military support, "responsible for direction and coordination of Intelligence Community support to military operations," acording to the agency's Web site.
Sarah Sewell may be coming to Washington from the lofty yards of Harvard, but she's well known in the capital's military corridors of power.

The Obama transition team yesterday named Sewell, on the faculty of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the university's Kennedy School of Government, as a team leader for the change of personnel at national security agencies.

But Sewell, a former Pentagon official in the Clinton administration, is also a close associate of Gen. David H. Petraeus, credited with turning around the situation in Iraq, mainly by crafting an alliance with Sunni tribal leaders against al Qaeda in Iraq, known as the Awakening

In fact, Sewell forged a Pentagon-Harvard partnership that led to the creation of a new counterinsurgency doctrine, not just in Iraq, but other regions fighting off insurgencies.

To top off the program, she wrote the introduction to its defining project, the celebrated Counterinsurgency Field Manual, whose Forward was written by none other than Petraeus.

"The Sewell foreword ... really rocks," wrote one fan, military analyst Thomas Barnett wrote.

Sewell emphasized how the accidental deaths of civilians, a regular occurrence lately in Afghanistan, can set back U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. 

"If one innocent civilian is killed it diminishes the goodwill of a whole family, a community, and a tribe," she wrote. 

And it helps the enemy recruit. 

"In this context killing the civilian is no longer just collateral damage. The harm cannot be easily dismissed as unintended. Civilian casualties tangibly undermine the counterinsurgent's goals."
 
Whatever one's take on her forward, Sewell's appointment suggests that Petraeus, now CENTCOM commander, is going to be around for a long while.