Scene: A Chicago conference room. Two men--one old, one young--sit at a table. Two other men sit in chairs away from the table.

B: It's good of you to come to see me on short notice.

J: Of course, I would.

B: Can I get right to the point?

J: Straight talk? Sure, fire away.

B: It was a tough campaign. But now it's over. And as I said on the campaign trail, I respect all you've done for this country. All you have given and sacrificed. I do. But now it's time to talk about what comes next. For you.

J: (Slightly sarcastic.) Thanks for thinking of me.

B: John, you're not going to have a lot of friends back there. There's Lindsey, Joe and...well, that's about it--

J: You don't have to worry about me--

B: I'm not worrying--

J: And you want to be my friend now?

B: Not your friend. Your partner. Listen, there's a lot we disagree on. But there are several big things we see eye-to-eye on. Guantanamo, torture, global warming, political reform. And I'd like to ask you, what would you now like to accomplish? What legislation would you like to pass? What do you want your legislative legacy to be?

J: Well, I was thinking of a different sort of legacy.

B: I get that. But now you have to ask yourself, what's the McCain Act of 2009 going to be? I'd really like for us to work together. And do something big. Neither of us needs the usual phony rhetoric that comes out of meetings like this. You don't need for me to issue some statement praising you and the spirit of bipartisanship. And I don't need empty words of support from you. That yada-yada-yada won't do us much good. And it especially won't help you back in the Senate where--let's be honest--you're not going to be the most popular guy in the Republican caucus--

J: I think you made that point already.

B: I know. But let's think about what you want to do. Whatever it is, it's not likely you're going to have a lot of support from your fellow Republicans. But if we can find something together, we can make it happen. I've already talked to Harry--

J: You have?

B: And he's all for this.

J: (Slightly sarcastic.) What a prince.

B: John, it's up to you. I am committed to passing the McCain-Whoever Act.

J: Even if it's with Joe?

B: (Sighs) Yes, even if it's with Joe.

J: (Resigned to the logic of the situation.) I see, my friend: keep your friends close, and your enemies closer.

B: No, John, it's putting country first.

J: Yeah, yeah, yeah, I get it: yes we can, right?

B: Actually, yes we can. If you want to.

J: Can we get back to you?

B: (Nodding to one of the other men.) Sure. Have Lindsey call Rahm whenever you want to move ahead.

J: Thanks.

B: Now, do you need a ride anywhere?

J: No, that's okay. Joe's downstairs with the car.

On a McCain campaign conference call with reporters on Tuesday, Senator Lindsey Graham and former POW Orson Swindle continued to bash retired General Wesley Clark for his recent statement that John McCain's military service did not qualify him to be president. Graham, who has become a lead attack dog for McCain, touted McCain's executive experience, citing his days as a squadron leader and his tenure in the Senate. And Exhibit A regarding McCain's spine-of-steel leadership, he noted, was McCain's criticism of Donald Rumsfeld's failed strategy in Iraq. This is a familiar refrain within the McCain camp: McCain was willing, even at political peril, to decry the disastrous Rumsfeld policy in Iraq. Supposedly, this shows McCain is a fellow of guts and grit.

Wait-a-second. It's not that gutsy when you scapegoat the Pentagon chief but let the commander in chief off easy. Moreover, why should McCain win points for denouncing a failure once it was widely perceived as a failure. Where was this former military man prior to the war. When informed experts--including General Eric Shinseki--were suggesting that the Rumsfeld plan for Iraq was inadequate (because a lot more troops would be needed inside the country after the invasion), McCain did not display prescience and courage by backing them up. I recall no sign of him questioning the planning of the war or the early post-invasion decisions of the Bush administration. Two weeks before the war, he said, "I have no qualms about our strategic plans."

After the invasion, McCain did stand by the administration and Rumsfeld for several years. In March 2004, he said, "We're on the right course." In May of that year, he was backing Rumsfeld, saying it was "premature" to talk of booting Rumsfeld from his job. "He's done a fine job," McCain remarked. In December 2005, he said, "I do think that progress is being made in a lot of Iraq" and called for staying the course. And into 2005, McCain insisted that there were the right number of troops in Iraq--that is, that no surge was needed. (You can find a list of McCain's everything's-going-well remarks here.)

Why award McCain a medal for eventually slamming Rumsfeld and backing a surge? Had he earlier--even before the war--pointed out problems and called for a more effective strategy, he would deserve kudos for both smarts and political courage. He did indeed break with Rumsfeld (not Bush) sooner than some other Republicans. But he rode the Bush-Rumsfeld Express for years. Which leads to this fair conclusion: had he been in charge, he would have made the same mistakes they did.

On Monday, I noted that when General David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, testified before Congress last September he wielded a chart entitled "Iraqi Security Forces Capabilities." That graphic aid hardly backed up the argument that the Iraqi forces were on the march. It showed that the level of Iraqi troops that were fully independent or that could stage operations of their own with the support of U.S. forces had dipped slightly between September 2006 and September 2007. That indicated that over the course of a year, according to Petraeus' own numbers, there had been no progress--none--in fielding Iraqi security forces that could function on their own. That seemed a rather strong indicator.

So on Tuesday morning, as I watched Petraeus' testimony before the Senate armed services committee, I waited to get his handouts to see what had happened on this front in the past seven months. As soon as he began testifying, the committee made his charts available. And--whaddayaknow?--this time he had no version of this chart. There was one chart indicating that more Iraqi battalions were now taking the lead in military operations than in January 2007. But this point was challenged by Senator Carl Levin, the committee chairman. Levin said that he was recently informed that of 110 joint U.S.-Iraqi operations of company size or greater in Iraq in the first three months of 2008, Iraqi forces assumed the lead in only ten of these missions. Still, Petraeus testified that the Iraqi forces have "grown significantly" since September, but he did not provide information on their capabilities that would allow an observer to compare current numbers to those he presented to Congress in September. Anyone care to guess why?

During his testimony, Petraeus said what was expected: the so-called surge is working, progress is real if fragile. And he said that there should be no reduction of troops beyond a return to the pre-surge levels. At the same time, the Democratic war critics on the committee missed a chance to present a cohesive and extensive challenge to Bush's war. I suss it all out here.