In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Condoleezza Rice has an article in which she tries to define an "American Realism" approach to foreign policy. It is full of foreign-policy speak. Here's an example:

How to describe this disposition of ours? It is realism, of a sort. But it is more than that -- what I have called our uniquely American realism. This makes us an incredibly impatient nation. We live in the future, not the past. We do not linger over our own history. This has led our nation to make mistakes in the past, and we will surely make more in the future. Still, it is our impatience to improve less-than-ideal situations and to accelerate the pace of change that leads to our most enduring achievements, at home and abroad.

At the same time, ironically, our uniquely American realism also makes us deeply patient.

Yes, we can be patient, and impatient. Wise, and dumb. Selfless, and self-interested. Inward-looking, and outward-peering. Warm, and cold. Caffeinated, and non-caffeinated.

In the course of this long article, Rice tries to glide past the Iraq mess, noting,

The cost of this war, in lives and treasure, for Americans and Iraqis, has been greater than we ever imagine.

Puh-lease. When she was national security adviser during the run-up to the war, the White House she served did all it could to suppress realism when it came to assessing the costs of a potential war with Iraq. Secretary Rice, remember Lawrence Lindsey? In late 2002, as the Bush gang were beating the war drums, Lindsey, director of Bush's National Economic Council, estimated the cost of the war could reach $200 billion. How did the Bush White House respond? It got rid of Lindsey. And it did the same to Army General Eric Shinseki when he said it would be necessary to keep hundreds of thousands of troops in Iraq after the invasion to secure and stabilize the country. Rice has plenty of chutzpah to claim now that the aftermath was unpredictable. As national security adviser, it was her responsibility--more than that of anyone else--to bring together Bush's national security team and make sure there were decent predictions and plans for what would come after the initial invasion. She did not do so.

Her attempt to define a coherent foreign policy strategy for the United States is--or should be--overshadowed by her own record of failure.

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