Colin Powell's endorsement of Barack Obama is a big deal--but it ought to be difficult for Obama-backers to raise a full-throated cheer for it. Obama's chief selling point at the start of the campaign was that he had been right on the Iraq war. Powell, of course, was not only wrong; he had lent his prestige to the invasion, fronting for the Bush White House on the phony WMD case. And while some may view Powell's Obama endorsement as a stab at rehabilitation, Powell has never fully come to public terms with his role in the Iraq WMD scandal.

On Meet the Press, Tom Brokaw gently approached the matter:

BROKAW: I want to ask you about your own role in the decision to go to war in Iraq. Barack Obama has been critical of your appearance before the United Nations at that time. Bob Woodward has a new book out called "The War Within," and here's what he had to say about Colin Powell and his place in the administration: "Powell didn't think Iraq was a necessary war, and yet he had gone along in a hundred ways, large and small. He had resisted at times but had succumbed to the momentum and his own sense of deference -- even obedience -- to the president. Perhaps more than anyone else in the administration, Powell had been the `closer' for the president's case on war." ...What's the lesson in all of that for a former -- for a new secretary of state or for a new national security adviser, based on your own experience?

POWELL: Well, let's start at the beginning. I said to the president in 2002, we should try to solve this diplomatically and avoid war. The president accepted that recommendation. We took it to the U.N. But the president, by the end of 2002, believed that the U.N. was not going to solve the problem, and he made a decision that we had to prepare for military action.I fully supported that. And I have never said anything to suggest I did not support going to war. I thought the evidence was there. And it is not just my closing of the whole deal with my U.N. speech. I know the importance of that speech, and I regret a lot of the information that the intelligence community provided us was wrong. But three months before my speech, with a heavy majority, the United States Congress expressed its support to use military force if it was necessary. And so, we went in and used military force.

My unhappiness was that we didn't do it right. It was easy to get to Baghdad, but then we forgot that there was a lot more that had to be done. And we didn't have enough force to impose our will in the country or to deal with the insurgency when it broke out, and that I regret....

BROKAW: Removing the weapons of mass destruction from the equation, because we now know that they did not exist, was it then a war of necessity or just a war of choice?

POWELL: Without the weapons of mass destruction present, as conveyed to us by the intelligence community in the most powerful way, I don't think there would have been a war. It was the reason we took it to the public. It was the reason we took it to the American people, to the Congress, who supported it on that basis, and it's the presentation I made to the United Nations. Without those weapons of mass destruction then, Iraq did not present to the world the kind of threat that it did if it had weapons of mass destruction.

That last sentence is a syllogism. Of course, without WMDs, Iraq was not the threat it would have been had it possessed WMDs. The point was that it did not possess WMDs. And as Michael Isikoff and I showed in our book, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War, the Bush administration purposefully exaggerated the error-ridden WMD case that was in itself based on faulty and incomplete evidence. But Powell dumps all the blame here on the intel gang for screwing up the intelligence. That's too convenient a dodge. Here's a case in point: the Bush White House claimed that aluminum tubes obtained by Saddam Hussein could only be used for nuclear centrifuges. Yet the nuclear scientists within the intelligence community with the most expertise on the subject disputed this. That did not stop Dick Cheney and Condi Rice from making claims on this matter that were utterly false--claims that analysts at Powell's Department of State would have known were false.

On a McCain campaign conference call with reporters on Tuesday, Senator Lindsey Graham and former POW Orson Swindle continued to bash retired General Wesley Clark for his recent statement that John McCain's military service did not qualify him to be president. Graham, who has become a lead attack dog for McCain, touted McCain's executive experience, citing his days as a squadron leader and his tenure in the Senate. And Exhibit A regarding McCain's spine-of-steel leadership, he noted, was McCain's criticism of Donald Rumsfeld's failed strategy in Iraq. This is a familiar refrain within the McCain camp: McCain was willing, even at political peril, to decry the disastrous Rumsfeld policy in Iraq. Supposedly, this shows McCain is a fellow of guts and grit.

Wait-a-second. It's not that gutsy when you scapegoat the Pentagon chief but let the commander in chief off easy. Moreover, why should McCain win points for denouncing a failure once it was widely perceived as a failure. Where was this former military man prior to the war. When informed experts--including General Eric Shinseki--were suggesting that the Rumsfeld plan for Iraq was inadequate (because a lot more troops would be needed inside the country after the invasion), McCain did not display prescience and courage by backing them up. I recall no sign of him questioning the planning of the war or the early post-invasion decisions of the Bush administration. Two weeks before the war, he said, "I have no qualms about our strategic plans."

After the invasion, McCain did stand by the administration and Rumsfeld for several years. In March 2004, he said, "We're on the right course." In May of that year, he was backing Rumsfeld, saying it was "premature" to talk of booting Rumsfeld from his job. "He's done a fine job," McCain remarked. In December 2005, he said, "I do think that progress is being made in a lot of Iraq" and called for staying the course. And into 2005, McCain insisted that there were the right number of troops in Iraq--that is, that no surge was needed. (You can find a list of McCain's everything's-going-well remarks here.)

Why award McCain a medal for eventually slamming Rumsfeld and backing a surge? Had he earlier--even before the war--pointed out problems and called for a more effective strategy, he would deserve kudos for both smarts and political courage. He did indeed break with Rumsfeld (not Bush) sooner than some other Republicans. But he rode the Bush-Rumsfeld Express for years. Which leads to this fair conclusion: had he been in charge, he would have made the same mistakes they did.